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BANCO DI ROMA's 
MEDITERRANEAN THRUST 
1900-1952 
J. A. Consiglio* 
The years between 1911 and 1945 constitute a period when, given the con-
current presence on the island of banks of French, Italian, British, and Mal-
tese origin, Malta already contained elements that could have been the foun-
dation for an internationalisation process of the financial sector in the coun-
try. In subsequent years this would certainly have been for the benefit of the 
island's economy, the hopes for which started getting closer to reality after 
the 1988 Malta International Business Act (Cap.330), subsequently further 
amended in 1994.1 
In this study I propose a close look at the Maltese, and more specifically 
Mediterranean, link with one of the major banks to be located in Malta during 
the first years of the twentieth century, i.e. the Banco di Roma. 2 
Up to our own times Banca di Roma is still one of Italy's major financial in-
stitutions. The bank's history - a major study in three extensive volumes by 
Luigi and Gabdele de Rosa, published between December of 1981 and No-
vember of 1983 - provides ample evidence that Malta was the third territory 
which the bank's strategists had earmarked wherein to commence the bank's 
expansion outside Italy, the previous two being Paris and Alexandria. 
The early 1900s were a period of dynamic progress for Banco di Roma. Pub-
lic approval and support for the sense of entrepreneurship which the bank's 
leadership was showing was shown through keen subscription to share issues 
which carried a high purchase premium. Nevertheless the bank's Board Min-
utes of the 7th of May 1906 records comment which suggests that domestic 
* lA Consiglio is a qualified banker and has been interested in researching Maltese banking history. 
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economic altruism on a national scale was not in fact guiding the bank be-
cause the bank was 'limiting its activities to those Italian provinces where 
commercial and industrial activity was at its height.,J 
During this period Banco di Roma held back from investing in Southern Italy. 
It ignored, for example, Italy's 1904 Act to promote industrialisation in the 
Neapolitan region, as well as those enacted between 1904 and 1906 for agri-
cultural expansion in the Calabria and Basilicata regions.4 
It therefore appears that the directors of Banco di Roma were predominantly 
guided by the belief that, consistent with limiting itself to the more active 
commercial centres, the bank was recording extraordinary progress. At the 
end of 1895, for example, the bank's total assets had been less than five mil-
lion Lire (including a loss of Lit 631,653 sustained in that year): but in a pe-
riod of less than eleven years, i.e. by end 1906, these assets had climbed to 
around 229 million Lire. 
Inauguration of the Branch in Malta 
Around halfway through that extremely profitable year, 1906, the decision to 
open a branch in Malta was taken. In truth well before that year various re-
quests, promptings, and suggestions had been made in this direction by sev-
eral Italian citizens working or living in Malta. What is worth noting is the 
fact that even a number of French or Francophile individuals - (and it must 
not be forgotten that a French bank, the Credit Foncier d'Algerie et de Tu-
nisie, already had a presence here) - showed interest in Banco di Roma open-
ing up in Malta. On 18th July 1906 the French Consul in Malta wrote to his 
Minister for Foreign Affairs5 that the island had 'a substantially high level of 
trade with the continent' and that, apart from Anglo Egyptian Bank Ltd 
(which already had important business dealings with the bourse in Paris, and 
with those in London and Cairo), in his opinion the island did not have 'a 
bank worthy of that name. ' 
Banco di Roma's president during that period was Giulio Pacelli. He was 
however much more than that. He was undoubtedly the bank's major busi-
ness getter and, it appears, also the bank's major researcher. Pacelli carried 
out a quiet but efficient study on Malta's economic situation, which led him 
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to various' conclusions. In the first instance it resulted to him that the few 
banks and bankers present on the island were not enough to satisfy the needs 
of local business. Secondly, in terms of size, population, and related savings 
patterns, the Maltese Islands were not, in his view, to be considered as poor. 
Finally, and above all, there were various religious orders, and a substantial 
commercial traffic generated by the presence of the British fleet and army. 
On the basis of these deductions, on 7th May 1906 the Board of Banco di 
Roma discussed the possibility of opening a branch in Malta.6 And only five 
months later, on the 4th October 1906 this branch was opened at No. 11, 
Archbishop Street, in Valletta, in a building which (ironically) years later 
would also come to house the Malta Government Savings Bank (an even 
older bank established in Malta in 1825 under the governorship of the Mar-
quis of Hastings). 
The Malta branch of Banco di Roma was placed under the supervision of a 
committee composed of six members nominated by the Bank from amongst 
Maltese personalities of the time. This committee had control and audit pow-
ers of a very wide extent, and its first members were Massimiliano De Bono, 
Arturo Mercieca, Architect Emanuele Galizia, the Baron of Gomerino Ugo 
Testaferrata, and Alfons Maria Micallef. 
Management of the branch was in the hands of a certain Signor Cantoni (no 
relationship to the famous impresario Luigi Cantoni who later was opera's 
major promoter in the island). Cantoni was called to serve in Malta from Tiv-
oli, and assisting him was Signor Bomaccini who, though being an Italian 
citizen, had been living in Malta for many years. It appears that the latter's 
choice for the post had prompted some general criticism as 'he [was] is not 
held to have the qualities required for an enterprise ofthis nature.'? 
Other employees in the supervisory grade were brought over from Italy, and a 
number of other workers were recruited in Malta. It appears that a determin-
ing factor (one does not exclude political considerations) in such employment 
was the ability to speak Italian as well as English and Maltese. Amongst the 
bank's local employees I owe mention of this researcher's uncle, Giuseppe 
Sidoli, who was married to Olga Sidoli (my aunt) who was then a well-
known pianist jn Malta. Sidoli was still enjoying his Banco di Roma pension 
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up to the years when this study was being researched, living in Palermo in 
Via Isidoro Carini (later to become the street where the atrocious murder of 
Carlo Alberto dalla Chiesa took place). During the 1940s Banco di Roma also 
had on their managerial staff in Malta Antonio Bavai who was from Ancona. 
He married Maria Hyzler and they later went to Palestine, and subsequently 
to Turkey, in the bank's service. 
The openIng of Banco di Roma's branch in Malta was a big event. The 
French Vice-Consul described it as a vera premiere alla quale it Tout Malta 
era stato invitato. 8 
The factor of religion 
In preliminary studies, and leading up to the immediate opening, of this 
branch in Malta it is very evident that the presence of a number of religious 
orders in Malta was an important factor. In Italy Banco di Roma was nickn-
med as the banca dei preti, and all religious in Malta at the time, eminently 
papist, approved and welcomed the bank's advent here. When Count So-
derino, and all the leading lights of the bank who came to Malta for the open-
ing arrived from Rome, they immediately paid a courtesy visit to Bishop 
Monsignor Salvatore Gaffiero. And they came duly equiped with very nice 
letters of introduction addressed to the reverend superiors of all the leading 
religious orders then present in Malta. 
On their part the Bishop, various members of the Camera POlltijicia, and can-
ons of the Cathedral Chapters and basilicas in Malta and Gozo, all attended 
the bank's inauguration. The obvious idea was that this new bank would be 
given all encouragement, and this it seems was something that was not at all 
welcomed by certain French diplomatic sources, judging by some reports that 
found their way to Rome from the local Consul.9 
Hardly had the Malta branch of Banco di Roma started to function that the 
local management increasingly started being faced with the question of 
whether the bank actually needed a different, or additional, branch, but this 
time located in Tripoli, Libya. 
Actually the bank as a whole was going through a very positive growth 
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phase. At the end of 1906,. despite expansion costs, profits were good and ex-
ceeded previous years, ID and an unchanged dividend of 7% was again distrib-
uted to shareholders. No doubt the overseas operations of the bank were a 
major contributing factor. In Egypt for example the bank had two branches, 
and in 1909 the crisis in production of cotton had pushed up prices with the 
bank making good profits from the thus ensuing heavy lending. Profits in the 
bank's Paris operations were also good. 11 
In June of 1909 Banco di Roma again decided on an increase in its Capital -
from 50 to 70 million Italian Lire - through the issue of 200,000 new shares 
at a price of Lit 102.50 per share, and these shares were reserved for existing 
shareholders on the basis of a two-for-one rights issue. 12 Luigi de Rosa, the 
bank's leading historian, holds that this capital increase was more intended to 
serve as a basis for territorial expansion in line with a long term plan, than to 
provide the bank with increased resources for its day to day business. It also 
appears that some pressure may have been brought to bear upon the bank - by 
the Banca d'ltalia (the national central bank) on the one hand, and by Banco 
di Napoli on the other - to absorb the Societa di Assicurazioni Diverse, an old 
Neapolitan financial institution established in 1895. 
The thrust towards the South 
It was only very gradually that Banco di Roma became slightly more amena-
ble to expansion towards the South. This is understandable given that equally 
slow was the change in that part of the country's economy, with possibly part 
of the reason for such change being attributable to legislation specifically in-
tended to boost industrialisation there. Apart from very substantial invest-
ment being made in steel plants in Bagnoli, many other new enterprises were 
set up, in engineering, in chemicals, and in textile activity. 
In the negotiations between Banco di Roma and the Neapolitan Societa' di 
Assicurazioni Diverse a number of intermediary banks carried out independ-
ent valuations. An agreement was eventually hammered out and that com-
pany, which despite its name was in fact a bank, ce~sed to operate on the 3rd 
of December 1908. Then on the 30th of June 1909 both its shareholders and 
those of Banco di Roma voted for its absorbtion into Banco di Roma. 
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On 18th of December 1909 Banco di Roma opened a new Mediterranean 
branch, this time in Naples. 13 But this operation cannot be held to have been 
a total success. Soon after initial celebration it became apparent that the posi-
tive elements which the Societa' di Assicurazioni Diverse had had in its in-
dustrial support operations in its Torre Annunziata branch (later reduced to 
agency status), and a turnover calculated in October 1909 at around 50 mil-
lion Lire,. were more than offset by property financing operations that were 
not performing. 
The next country in Banco di Roma's Mediterranean strategy was Spain. Just 
as certain indigenous elements had stimulated the bank's interest in Malta, so 
did certain individuals in pushing the bank towards opening a branch in Bar-
celona. At that time the provinces of Catalonia were in an economically ex-
pansionist juncture, with many old and new industries and other activity of a 
commercial nature. 14 
So for Banco di Roma - which now had branches in Genova, Naples, Malta, 
Benghazi, Alexandria, and Paris - a branch in Barcelona meant much in pure 
business expansion terms, besides that of obvious prestige. We again find the 
same Pacelli who, encouraged and fully supported by his fellow directors, 
went to Barcellona to set the scenario and evaluate the possibilities for open-
ing a branch. There he established contact with the owners of an old indige-
nous bank. This was a small but very solid bank - the Catalana General de 
Credito - and its owners offered Banco di Roma a sale not only of the busi-
ness and goodwill but also of the bank's buildings, all at favourable terms. 
Pacelli was authorised to negotiate an agreement, and the bank purchased fur-
niture, fittings, a safe, and all that was in the Barcelona, Tarragona, and 
Montblanch offices at an agreed price of 400,000 pesetas which represented 
50 per cent of the total price for this Catalonian bank. 
Catalona General de Credito, which had been founded in 1856, was pre-
dominantly an investment bank. Its portfolio was of some two-and-a-half mil-
lion Lire, and it held the guarantees of its own directors, some of whom were 
of very substantial means. 
The Board of Banco di Roma found no problems in ratifying the agreement 
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hammered out by Pacelli, and the opening of a branch at Barcellona, with an 
agency at Tarragona, for an indefinite period and with a capital of one million 
pesetas, was authorised. All activities at the previous agency at Montblanch 
were however for the moment suspended. 15 
For the management of the new branch at Barcellona the Board decided to 
transfer the manager of the branch in Genoa, and until the move was made 
temporary running of the place was left in th~ hands of the Alexandria branch 
manager, Manuel Guerra. The inauguration of the branch, and that of the 
agency at Tarragona (this being an important centre for. agricultural produce 
and export towards Northern Europe), was held on the 15th of January 1910, 
and good banking business started being done right from day one. Eventually, 
increase in business in Barcellona led the management to realise that reopen-
ing of the Montblanch agency was a necessity. 
The years 1907 and 1908 were critical ones for the Italian economy. Despite 
some signs of improvement in the external industrial environment in the fol-
lowing year, the domestic scene remained unchanged, and both the banking 
and industrial sectors faced many problems of bankruptcies. Although Banco 
di Roma's main investments had a prudent spread over a variety of sectors, 
with agricultural financing luckily being prevalent, the Bank still suffered 
some losses from the failures of several industrial companies. 16 
Amortising, or even outright writing off, of losses ensuing from such credits 
made 1909 a very difficult year. Since 1898 Banco di Roma had been paying 
its shareholders a dividend of 7 per cent, something which only a few other 
Italian banks were in a situation to do. And 7 per cent had also been the 
amount paid in years when perhaps even more was available for disbursing. 
Now however, in 1909, seven per cent was certainly appearing as an exag-
geration. 
Three of the directors were in favour of a six per cent dividend. One of them, 
the Marquis Theodoli, maintained that this was a figure consonant with pru-
dent practice, was in any case a decent return, and above all would not com-
promise the programme which the bank had for further expansion. Theodoli 
held that it was only the small shareholders who were interested in large divi-
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dends, but these were hardly in a situation to help in the bank's plans for fur-
ther growth. Despite these arguments however at the end of the discussions a 
dividend of 7 per cent was still paid. 
In Libya 
At this juncture Banco di Roma's Mediterranean history it becomes easy to 
venture into the account of how the Bank - which at this point was the only 
Italian bank with branches outside Italy - became involved in what some 
commentators have euphemistically described as the 'peaceful penetration' of 
Libya. This is in itself a long story, and perhaps it suffices here to state that 
Tommaso Tittoni - who had previously been a director of the bank but was 
now Minister for Foreign Affairs - had been totally in favour of there being a 
branch in Tripoli to serve as yet another link in the Italy-Paris-Malta-Egypt 
commercial and financial chain that was being built. . 
Banco di Roma's presence in Tripoli had its start on the 15th of April 1907, 
when Enrico Bresciani as Manager, and Henry J. Cotugno as his assistant, 
opened up for business. And it leads up to the 28th of September 1911 when, 
after uncontrollable protests and public rioting, many foreigners started leav-
ing the country. On the previous day some 300 of these left Tripoli aboard the 
French ship Rhone, and approximately another 150 left on other ships bound 
for Malta. 
By the end of 1925, from what had been built up as a sizeable framework of 
foreign branches, Banco di Roma now held under its control only the 
branches it had in Switzerland (in Chiasso and Lugano), in Turkey, Syria, 
Palestine, and the one in Malta which was obviously predominantly looked 
upon as a source of deposit funding. 
By the end of 1926 Banco di Roma was employing a total of 2756 employees 
in its branches in Italy, and 316 in those overseas. In Malta the number in that 
year read 20, which exceeded those employed in its representative offices in 
London (where 10 people worked) and in New York (two), but less than in 
Turkey (145), in Syria (77), Palestine (40) and Switzerland (20), i.e. for a to-
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tal of 3072 employees. 
The Abyssinian conflict 
But fortunes soon changed again. Early in 1930 most accounts from Banco di 
Roma's overseas branches were again looking bullish. All offices in Turkey, 
Syria, Palestine, France, and Egypt were finding no problem in conforming to 
plans, targets, and directives coming from Head Office, mainly to the effect 
that 'lending totals agree to the level of deposits that the group of branches in 
a territory would have raised, whilst remaining constantly available for sur-
plus funds to be moved from one group of branches to another in case of 
need.' And Malta - despite the fact that all the other local banks, Maltese or 
English owned, were hostile towards Banco di Roma - still remained a pri-
mary foreign currency source for the bank. 
But Giuseppe Pietro Veroi, the bank's managing director, was already coun-
seling caution as to what could happen to the bank's branches in the Mediter-
reanean should there be further deterioration in the already threatening crisis 
between Italy and Abyssinia. Views in the British press on Mussolini's 
claims were alrea.dy raising doubts about the future. To FeIice Guarneri, who 
was the bank's economist and foreign currency supervisor, Veroi wrote: The 
Bank must keep a wary eye open on the delicate situations in Malta, in Pales-
tine, and in Egypt [ ... ]' 
And he added: 'If confidence in our institution were to drop in London we 
would then have to expect a widening of unfavourable consequences also in 
Malta, and what is today a regular, controlled, but hopefully pluggable drip, 
can easily transform itself into a river of withdrawals that would take away 
from us those deposits placed with Head Office, with later similar conse-
quences in Palestine and Egypt.' 17 Veroi, as we shall see, was a good prophet: 
the worsening of Italian relations with London had serious consequences on 
all the foreign branches of Banco di Roma, and especially so in Malta. 
The international community's reply to Italy's interventionist policy in Abys-
sinia was that of economic sanctions. The strained relationship between Italy 
and the United Kingdom left its effects on banking business, and commercial 
and banking credits in favour of Italy were revoked. British banks were the 
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first to reduce, and eventually completely stop, all acceptance credits in fa-
vour of Italian banks. Then followed American and Dutch banks. 
Mussolini, acutely worried about (amongst other concerns) adequate supplies 
of coal and steel for his war machine, imposed a total national monopoly on 
overseas purchases of these resources. He simultaneously introduced a num-
ber of financial measures: a total stop to payment of any dividends by all 
commercial companies; a total stop to the granting of any external credit; 
obligatory conversion of all shareholdings in foreign or Italian companies 
into Italian Treasury Bonds with a coupon rate of 5 per cent; a tax of 10 per 
cent on all bearer shares not issued by the state; no doubt a very formidable 
array of measures. 
Despite everything however these measures still did not put a stop to a certain 
regular rate of increase in domestic banking activity which had evolved with 
the early signs of war. On the eve of Italian military operations in Abyssinia, 
Veroi reported an increase in all sectors of the nation's economic and social 
life 'as a consequence of the bigger needs in the organisation of the nation's 
defence.' 
A "run" on the Bank 
By contrast the bank's overseas business was certainly feeling the effects of 
the tension with the United Kingdom, particularly in Malta and in the Middle 
East. In Malta especially the bank's clients showed total and real panic, with 
many withdrawals of deposits, which in the first days of August 1935 were at 
a daily rate of between thirty-five and forty thousand Sterling. Naturally this 
raised a lot of worry in Rome because Malta was the main source of foreign 
exchange for the Bank: un vero Jorziere di divise estere (a veritable strong-
hold of foreign currency), according to Veroi. 
The Malta branch of Banco di Roma had established for itself all the classic 
characteristics of a savings bank. But one questions to what extent were cus-
tomers of this bank drawn to it by its particular characteristics, rather than by 
favourable treatment in terms of interest. In correspondence dated 2nd Feb-
ruary 1935 with Vincenzo Azzolini, Governor of the Banca d'Italia (the cen-
tral bank), regarding an ABI (Associazione Bancaria Italia) report on the ac-
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ti vities abroad ofItalian banks, Veroi said: 
Our institution, because of its origins, because of its support by Catho-
lics, and because of the name it bears, now exercises on the island an 
influence and impact which neither the keen competition of other bank-
ing institutions (in the front line Barclays and Credit Fancier d'Algerie 
et de Tunisie, as well as other banks), nor the repeated slanted and hos-
tile press campaigns, sometimes based on political grounds, sometimes 
on financial grounds, have managed to dent. 
In his letter to Azzolini, Veroi requested that all the deposits which the Malta 
branch held with the Istituto Nazionale per i Cambi con l'Estero (also known 
as Cambital, the Italian state's collating and control body for all foreign ex-
change holdings) be given interest not at the then current market rate for ex-
ternal deposits of 2 per cent, but at 4 per cent, to make good for the price of 
attracting such deposits in Malta. As an exceptional measure Azzolini con-
ceded a rate of 3 per cent. 
Nevertheless what had come to be considered as a pillar of the Italian bank-
ing system in a British territory was severely shaken when economic sanc-
tions started to have their effect. The truth is - and this is amply confirmed in 
the writings by historians of other banking institutions - that it was not only 
Banco di Roma's client base that panicked and resorted to large withdraw-
als. I8 
The following is the extent of how deposits decreased between December 
1934 and September 1935 in Banco di Roma's overseas branches: 
Pounds Sterling 
Malta 33,087 
Palestine 31,630 
Syria 13,512 
Switzerland 2,572 
Turkey 9,564 
TOTAL __ ____ ___ £90,365 
A substantial part of this decrease was by way of withdrawals that took place 
between June and August of 1935. In percentage terms Banco di Roma's de-
posits fell by 55 per cent in Malta during 1935, with larger drops taking place 
in Palestine (80%), in Sirya (70%), and in Switzerland (60%), and a lower 
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drop (35%) in Turkey. 
The major problem for the bank during this period was obviously that of suf-
ficient bank notes to satisfy demand. Supplies from London for banks in 
Malta had now become very irregular, and the banks started to impose maxi-
mum limits for withdrawals, also often resorting to police assistance to help 
control queues at their doors. In just one day, on the 27th of September 1938, 
the Malta branch of Banco di Roma paid out 40,000 in Sterling notes. In Bei-
rut, on the same day, seven million French Francs were paid out, these being 
substantial amounts for those times. 
The effects of Mussolini's Mediterranean ambitions were never far from the 
bank's suffering employees. In October of 1935, soon after the start of hos-
tilities in Abyssinia, Nicola Parodi, manager of the branch in Malta, was ar-
rested by the British authorities and accused of 'activities prejudicial to the 
interests and salvation of Malta.' He was sent back to his country and later 
placed in charge of the bank's branch in Lugano up to March of 1946. 
Banco di Roma's branches outside Italy, and particularly so those in Malta 
and Beirut, received absolutely no help or support from the branches of com-
peting banks from other countries. Giuseppe Veroi had forseen this and wrote 
about it to his superiors in 1935. There was in fact a sort of mini-war between 
the banks. The Banque de Syrie et du Liban, which in its country had the 
right of note issue, removed all credit lines hitherto given to Banco di Roma. 
And Barclays Bank, perennially a competitor of Banco di Roma in the Medi-
terranean, refused even the slightest temporary overdraft, even choosing to 
ignore documentary evidence of remittances in transit in favour of the bank 
from London. 
On the 27th of September Veroi wrote to Guarneri, now a Minister, that up to 
then the bank had coped with the situation using its own resources, but now it 
had reached the stage of having to draw on its deposits with the lstituto Nazi-
onale per i Cambi con l'Estero. And, he added, the situation was now wors-
ening as a result of the fact that telegraphic transfers could not be sent to 
Malta. 'If this branch's tills are kept without funds', wrote Veroi, 'we would 
be moving towards an irretreivable situation, one which would effect not only 
the branch in Malta, but which would extend to the whole group of our 
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branches in the Mediterranean and which, given the particular legal situation, 
would involve the whole bank.' 19 
Such problems of Banco di Roma, as also was the case of other banks, had 
their reflection in the total national problem of insufficient foreign currency. 
Because even were the state to fully honour its foreign currency committ-
ments with the local banks, the problem of defending its creditworthiness 
with other countries still remained. In Italy Cambital (the lstituto Nazionale 
per i Cambi con l' Estero) was faced with the choice of either abandoning 
every Italian bank abroad to its own fate, or helping them right up to the bitter 
end. The choice was eventually the latter, and Banco di Roma even resorted 
to hiring a private plane from London to fly the needed notes to Malta. 
The situation continued to worsen, and by 1939 the position of Banco di 
Roma's branches in the Mediterranean and in the East (bar those in Africa 
which appear to have remained unaffected) in terms of deposits was very un-
encouraging. But Veroi, and Guarneri - now again with the Bank as its new 
President - had unfortunately both come to be tainted with that brand of gran-
diose visions of national fascism which Mussolini had worked so hard to im-
plant in the majority of those who occupied vital positions in national institu-
tions. In the bank's Board Meeting of the 18th September 1940 Veroi went 
so far as to present new plans for expansion of the bank's operations in Tuni-
sia, Sudan, Cyprus, Algeria, Morocco, and later in Nizza and Monaco. 
The War 
But reality was vastly different. In almost all the branches which the bank 
had in the Mediterranean events full of problems were reaching their apex, 
and the end came soon after. During the night between the 10th and 11 th 
of June 1940 the manager of the branch in Malta, Corradino Jannaccio, 
was arrested, the bank's keys taken from him, and then interned. 
He had only been sent to Malta twenty-one days before 'to help in the dif-
ficult task of calming the many requests being made for withdrawals of 
deposits. ,20 Some of the bank's other Italian employees in Malta were also 
interned to San Giovanni d' Acri in Palestine. 
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In all the bank's branches in Palestine, in Haifa (where furniture and equip-
ment was taken .away and auctioned), in Baghdad, in Syria, everywhere the 
war now suddenly led to a crash of all the extraordinary progress which the 
bank had made in less than half a century. In eighteen months Bcinco di Roma 
lost sixteen offices in Eastern Africa, the branch in Malta, four in Palestine, 
six in Syria, and one in Iraq, for a total loss of 28 offices. These branches had 
been making an annual contribution of some 100 million Italian Lire to the 
bank's total turnover, and so were a great setback. 
But back home in Italy Banco di Roma was still in a very healthy liquid posi-
tion. And it made up for these losses through intensifying its domestic activ-
ity, to a point where for the first eleven months of 1941 Veroi could report a 
turnover of 1005 million Lire, compared with 814 millions in the previous 
year. 
The whole of Italian banking history between the two world wars is rich in 
examples of personalities with great vision; individuals who, precisely at mo-
ments when clouds were gathering, were already thinking in terms of what 
would need to be done after the conflict. Valerio Castronovo, for example, in 
his history of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro21 mentions Arturo Osio, Imbriani 
Longo, and Giuseppe Corridori as examples. Banca Commerciale Italiana 
and Credito Italiano who, like Banco di Roma and BNL, were the other two 
leading financial institutions having state participation, these too had their 
great names. 
The situation in various Banco di Roma overseas branches became even more 
complicated as the war drew towards its end. In some of them the provision 
of services to the public had ceased, and the assets of the bank had been se-
questered by the victorious Allies as indemnification for the conflict. Later, 
the problems related to payments for war damages, those of repayment of de-
posits to account holders, and the returning back to their homeland of some 
of the Italian employees who had been kept here as prisoners of war, also 
came to be faced. Specifically insofar as the repayment of deposits to Mal-
tese persons and entities is concerned however, this writer, having been per-
sonally involved in the end-part of such exercise even up to as late as the 
1970's, can vouch that Banco di Roma carried out its obligations to the full 
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and with precision. 
After the War 
Article 69 of the peace treaty, which authorised the nations victorious in the 
conflict to assume ownership of private property pertaining to citizens of the 
defeated countries as reimbursement for war damages, left the Bank in a 
practically hopeless situation. All the efforts of Guglielmo Di Consiglio and 
Montanucci Manlio in Banco di Roma's branches in France, by Vittorino 
Veronese in Beirut, by Noya, Cambieri, Ribecco, and several others in vari-
ous branches, aimed at reducing as much as possible the bank's losses, only 
produced very limited results. But, as I said, above all depositors were re-
funded, and no doubt this was attributable not only to great sacrifices made in 
Rome, but also to the high sense of integrity and decorum of the bank's lead-
ers, aided and abetted no doubt by the new postwar sense of determination to 
rebuild la nuova [talia del miracolo economico. 
At the end of the war the whole question of Banco di Roma's activities out-
side Italy - both in terms of branches as well as of representative offices - was 
again discussed. In certain cases it was a question of liquidation methodol-
ogy; in others that of reopening branches in locations which had been in-
volved in the conflict. So the obvious key question was: what best to do, re-
open or liquidity certain old branches? In some cases the decision was decid-
edly simple: the situation absolutely did n'ot justify reopening. 
But in certain other locations - pl~ces like Tripoli, Asmara, as well as Malta, 
where the business had been well established and had had a certain aura of 
tradition - the problem was a more complicated one. Questions which needed 
to be answered included: what had exactly happened in these places? Was it 
possible to conceive reattracting former clients? Or acquiring new and prom-
ising customer segments? What were the overall business prospects for the 
bank? Inevitably the bank had to send leading executives to attempt answers 
to these questions. ' 
In its efforts for a reawakening in the Mediterranean of its fortunes Banco di 
Roma once again started to face the open resistance of its competitors, and of 
individuals who, it must be said, clearly bared on their sleeves interests that 
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were often political or ideological, besides purely commercial. Despite this 
Banco di Roma again opened up in Beirut, with the former manager of Banco 
di Roma (France), Guglielmo di Consiglio, as its new manager. 
The return to Tripoli was also interesting. It appears that resistence by Bar-
clays Bank was somewhere behind the scenes. Up to late July 1948 represen-
tations with the British authorities by both Arab as well as Jewish interests 
for reopening there of the bank's branches were still under way. But in Libya 
too, as in Lebanon, the link was again reestablished because on the l3th of 
August 1951 the Tripoli branch of Banco di Roma was reopened. 
Similar efforts were made for the reopening of the branch in Benghazi, and 
repeated requests were made to the Libyan authorities. The final answer came 
on 17th of October 1952, and it was a negative one with the reason given be-
ing: 'for serving the needs of the Benghazi market we feel that the institutions 
presently functioning, viz. Barclays Bank and Arab Bank, are sufficient.,22 
With the more cruel salt in the wound being probably the fact that Barclays 
moved into operation precisely in the same· building that had previously 
served as Banco di Roma's branch! 
The Banco di Roma branch in Rhodes remained similarly closed. The Turk-
ish ones in Izmir and Istanbul however continued to function and there, as 
stated, the branch manager for some time was Antonio Bavai. He hailed from 
Ancona and had married the former Maria Hyzler in Malta. Other branches 
which reopened after the war were those at Asmara in Eritrea (on the 5th of 
July 1948), and in Mogadishu in the Sudan (on the 15th May 1950). 
The branch in Malta 
It was evident therefore that Banco di Roma had again solidly taken up the 
road of asserting its formerly important status in the Mediterranean and in 
certain parts of Africa and the Middle East. But the last developments in the 
history of the branch which it had had in Malta are, as elsewhere, sufficient 
reflection of the colonial interests that were involved. 
We have already referred to the fact that before the war this branch was an 
important source of deposits. These funds used to be sent to Head Office in 
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Rome, and the bank then either lent them to the Italian government, or rein-
vested them with its leading correspondents in London: and this in view of 
the reality that at that time Malta could by no means have been considered as 
an investment centre with capacity for profitable absorption or refund of such 
capitals. Luigi de Rosa23 also holds that at some time part of these funds had 
also been invested as capital in a new bank bearing the name Banco Italo-
Egiziano. 
Some documentation in Banco di Roma's archives suggests that the British 
authorities showed reticence and total aversion to the bank's efforts to reopen 
its Malta branch. One could consider this as somewhat strange when one sees 
that Barclays Bank had already been given permission to reopen their 
branches in Italy: Even the conditions which were being made by the British 
authorities for the reopening of the bank's branch in Malta had been ac-
cepted. In essence these were to the effect that, firstly, the Italian Treasury 
Minister had to give a guarantee that when Banco di Roma reopens its Malta 
branch all deposits raised locally would be used only in Malta. The second 
condition was that the bank would bind itself to employ 'only Maltese or 
British citizens as staff.' 
But negotiations dragged on endlessly. At the heart of these discussions was 
Ugo Foscolo, the bank's managing director, and at the Board Meeting of the 
5th of October 1950 he reported as follows: 
Since that date (i.e. since the previous meeting with the British authori-
ties held on the 4th of April 1949) these negotiations have continued, 
but notwithstanding that the Bank has accepted all the conditions im-
posed by the British authorities as long as the Branch (in Malta) is re-
opened, these same British authorities have continued to beat around 
the bush (tergiversare - dillydallying - is the word he used!) to the 
point where, in virtue of the April 1947 Treaty between Italy and the 
United Kingdom, the refund of deposits has been imposed irrespective 
of whether the branch is reopened or not. 
After the carrying out by its senior managers of certain confirmatory exer-
cises of deposits effectively due refundable to Maltese account holders, the 
Bank announced that it was prepared to make the payments, and an initial re-
mittance of 84,000 Pounds Sterling was made. Insofar as the accruing of in-
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terests was concerned for the period after the 16th of June 1940, i.e. five days 
after the arrest of the Malta branch manager Corradino Jannaccio, the Bank 
made it known that it would be favourably inclined towards - pure!.v Oil a 
moral basis - paying these should the reopening of its branch be authorised. 
But because this authorisation never' came the Bank refused to pay the re-
quests which it continued to receive for such interests. 
On and off these negotiations dragged for a further two years. On the 16th of 
September 1952 the Government of Malta - the British Governor at the time 
was Sir Gerald Hallen Creasy and the Prime Minister was Doctor Giorgio 
Borg Olivier - informed the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Her 
Majesty's Government and the Government of Malta 'no longer had any fur-
ther objections to the reopening of Banco di Roma 's branch in Malta. ' 
But this time it was Banco di Roma who simply chose not to do anything 
about the issue. And it would appear as if this was a choice consciously made 
on the basis of an analysis. of 'the problems of a monetary nature which are 
currentl y being debated in the Sterling Area.' 24 
By the end 9f 1952 virtually the whole of Banco di Roma's Mediterranean 
presence had ended. On the one hand the war had rendered difficult, if not 
impossible, that the Bank would return to the former colonies or occupied ter-
ritories. On the other hand the reasons were the inevitable rivalry remaining 
between the Bank and the British authorities, and the simple fact that certain 
locations were no longer of any interest to the Bank in pure commercial 
terms. 
But the bank's losses in the Mediterranean and in North Africa were more 
than made up for by a very active presence in the Middle East and, above all, 
in the countries which later were to form the European Community. Banco di 
Roma (France) with Guglielmo Di Consiglio once again at its helm after his 
service in Beirut, Banco di Roma. (Belgium), and Banco di Roma per la 
Svizzera, became efficient spearheads which since then have led a continuous 
presence in international banking. 
There is general agreement that the inspiratory start of this new period, 
around August of 1947, was the appointment of Bresciani Tun'oni as the 
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bank's new managing director. He was given responsibility for the bank's in-
ternational reconstruction and development, working from an office located 
very far away from all that has been described in this account, i.e. in Wash-
ington. The historical orientation of Banco di Roma had indeed changed. 
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